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In this article we consider the potential of a Basic Income (BI) as a mechanism for 
promoting well-integrated and autonomous social and productive development 
in the newly independent Democratic Republic of East Timor, and for expanding 
the freedoms of its population that is struggling to throw off the bitter legacy of 
25 years of colonial and postcolonial spoliation and violence. In 1999 the people 
of East Timor voted overwhelmingly for independence, whereupon pro-
Indonesian militia immediately set out on a campaign of destruction – 
murdering hundreds, destroying 70% of the country’s infrastructure, and 
reducing towns to rubble. An international peacekeeping force intervened, after 
which a United Nations mission took control until independence in 2002, paving 
the way for an aid-dependent economy. Almost a decade later, East Timor is one 
of the world’s poorest countries. Security is precarious, mainly because of the as-
yet-unaddressed poverty and a 50% unemployment rate; and democracy is 
seriously impaired. East Timor will continue to rely on outside help for many 
years; it has been described disparagingly as the “ultimate welfare state” 
(Mydans, 2000). More than $US3.5 billion in aid was poured into East Timor via 
UN and international aid agencies between 2002 and 2006. Most of this aid paid 
the wages of aid officials and consultants seeking contracts for companies based 
in the donor countries, and paid for infrastructure and services required for 
foreign investment. 
Food insecurity is widespread in the predominantly rural population, partly 
due to weather conditions, to insect plagues and, in particular, to improper 
allocation of the available food grains, either produced or imported, which tend 
to end up in the hands of profiteers. Little attempt has been made to encourage 
self-sufficient, ecologically sustainable agriculture or to build up the rural 
infrastructure that would stimulate local markets and economies. As we show in 
this article, a BI would constitute a viable way of addressing poverty in these 
circumstances. First, we briefly explain the idea of socioeconomic independence 
as a necessary condition for freedom, and we show how the values and aims 
expressed in East Timor’s Constitution are akin to the republican tradition, a 
political tradition with considerable presence in contemporary normative 
debates on BI.1 Second, we outline the main social and economic problems faced 
by the new Democratic Republic of East Timor and argue that a BI financed by 
oil and natural gas revenues could play a major role in combating these 
problems. Third, we suggest the main options for financing a BI in a poverty-
                                                 
1 See the debate on “Basic Income and the Republican Legacy” in Basic Income Studies 2 (2) with contributions by 
Casassas (2007), Domènech and Raventós (2007), Pateman (2007), Pettit (2007), and White (2007); also Raventós 
(2007). 
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stricken country like East Timor. Finally, we highlight how the country’s present 
reality is that of a highly unequal political conflict: with, on the one hand, 
attempts to impose an externally directed State and, on the other hand, 
diametrically opposite attempts to construct a solid, autonomous institutional 
complex that is much more in tune with the actual needs and potential of East 
Timorese society. In our view, the latter would permit a beneficial model of 
development, which however requires guaranteeing the right of existence to all 
East Timorese in the form of a BI. 
1. Basic Income and the Right to Material Existence 
The cornerstone of the republican idea of freedom is that of the absence of 
material dependence. While classical republican thinkers differ in many respects 
(Domènech and Raventós, 2007), they share two convictions relevant to poor 
countries like East Timor. First, being free in the republican sense means not 
having to depend on any other person for one’s material existence. The person 
who lacks material independence is unfree in the sense of not having his or her 
“right of existence” guaranteed: she is not a citizen in her own right (sui iuris) but 
lives at the mercy of others because dependence on another party subjects her to 
an alien regime (alieni iuris). Second, republican freedom cannot prevail if 
property ownership is unequally distributed to an extent that allows property-
rich individuals to impose their own conception of the public good upon the 
republic, effectively curtailing any chance of freedom for the remaining 
population (Domènech, 2004). 
Echoes of the republican ideas of universally guaranteeing the bases of 
material existence as a right appear in the Constitution of East Timor, but remain 
absent in the discussion of the country’s economic, social and political tensions. 
For instance, the Constitution declares that the State aims “to promote the 
harmonious and integrated development of the sectors and regions and the fair 
distribution of the national product.”2 Elsewhere the Constitution calls for 
sustainable development, gender equality, a participatory democracy, and access 
to education and good health as being essential for the country’s sustainability.3 
But how can this be achieved when the vast majority of the population does not 
                                                 
2 Constitution of East Timor: Part I, Section 6, “Objectives of the State,” (I). 
3 See in particular, in the Constitution of East Timor: Part II, Title III, Section 50, [1] (gender rights); Part II, Title III, 
Section 50, [15] (cooperatives and household businesses); Part III, Title II, Section 63, [2] (civil and political rights); 
Part IV, Title I, Section 139, [1] (equitable use of national resources); and Part IV, Title II, Section 142 (provision of 
financial resources for economic development). http://www.gov.east-timor.org/constitution/constitution-Timor-
Leste.pdf . 
3Casassas et al.: Basic Income in East Timor
have access to the material means of existence that would give them the freedom 
to participate as sui iuris citizens? In our view, this dilemma lies at the core of 
East Timor’s many social problems, including urban overcrowding, chronic 
agricultural underproduction, alienated youth, high unemployment, violence 
and the very low participation of women in the sphere of paid employment that 
have led several observers to predict that East Timor is well on the way to failed 
statehood.4 
We believe that a BI would be an effective means of establishing a 
democratic system with the highest possible degree of participation, including 
the poorest and hitherto most excluded and vulnerable members of society. 
Because of its universal and unconditional nature, a BI would be effective in 
constructing a more egalitarian and participative society and in offering 
republican freedom to everyone. While a BI proposal for a poor country would 
be primarily concerned with eradicating hunger, starvation and the most 
extreme forms of poverty, it would also improve general income distribution and 
would create job and professional opportunities. 
Currently, in East Timor, development policy typically takes the form of ill-
fated, isolated, precariously funded initiatives that often fail to coordinate with 
local priorities in terms of the real political, social and productive needs of the 
different regions. These have an impact on crucial matters such as agrarian 
reform, cooperative endeavours, local-scale agricultural projects, environmentally 
sustainable projects, improving the territorial balance between rural and urban 
areas, security, public education, and health service facilities. The material 
independence guaranteed by a BI can create the conditions for sustained 
economic progress precisely in these areas by opening up autonomous collective 
or individual productive opportunities for the population. 
East Timor is particularly handicapped because most members of its (mainly 
Chinese) fledgling middle class were either killed or fled after the Indonesian 
invasion in 1975, hence there are virtually no home-grown entrepreneurial 
activities, leaving the field open for profit-seeking foreign interests. A BI would 
seem to be the best way of providing an impetus for much-needed 
autochthonous ventures. BI enables citizens to take initiative and liberates 
human resources, that are currently wasted, for the public benefit. In short, BI 
can improve the overall well-being of a society by offering individual freedom: to 
paraphrase Amartya Sen (1999), real social and economic development can only 
                                                 
4 East Timor (Timor-Leste) figures as number 20 on the Failed States Index. See 
 http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=229&Itemid=366. 
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occur in poor countries when there is greater freedom of choice for all members 
of society. This crucial insight brings us to the specific case of East Timor. 
2. Why East Timor Needs a Basic Income 
East Timor is essentially an agrarian economy: before the massive displacement 
of 1999, 90% of the population lived in rural areas. It is one of the world’s poorest 
countries, with over 40% of the population living on less than the official poverty 
line of 55 US cents a day while, in rural areas, this figure is closer to 50%.5 
According to the 2006 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) report, 
optimistically titled “The Path out of Poverty,” the annual 2004 per capita GDP in 
East Timor was US$370, which is marginally over US$1 a day, but in rural areas 
the figure was only US$150.6 However dire these figures are, they do not reveal 
the extent of the vulnerability of the most disadvantaged groups: small farmers 
in insecure or flood- and landslide-prone areas; people without livestock; 
families with many dependants; street children; female household heads; women 
without education or living in isolated rural areas; victims of violence, including 
rape; victims of psychological trauma; homeless and internally displaced 
persons; and so on.7  
According to the World Food Programme, “The high food insecurity is 
apparent in Timor Leste's malnutrition rates, which are some of the highest in 
Asia. About 47% of children under the age of five are chronically malnourished 
(stunted) and 43% severely malnourished (underweight). The rate of wasting is 
about 12% nationwide.”8 The long-term physical and mental effects of this 
nutritional deprivation constitute both a massive human tragedy and a chronic 
socioeconomic burden. Infant mortality rates are extremely high: 136 children 
per 1,000 die before the age of five, and 90 of these die in their first year. 
Maternal mortality rates are 800 per 100,000 births. Life expectancy is 55 years. 
The present food crisis in East Timor is not an isolated phenomenon but a 
generalised food-security problem. Only 3% of rural farmers use commercial 
                                                 
5 This does not count petroleum revenues, which were expected to reach a total of $5,328.6 million (some 94.8% 
of total revenue) from 2008 to 2012. See “RDTL State Budget for 2009 as Proposed to Parliament: Part 6, 
Revenue,” 9 December 2008, La’o Hamutuk. http://www.laohamutuk.org/econ/OGE09/08OJE2009Revenue.htm. 
6 See http://planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/East Timor/East Timor%20HDR%202006.pdf. 
7 Some 90,000 houses were severely damaged or destroyed in the militia violence of 1999. In the unrest of 2006, 
over 100,000 people were made homeless. The total number of internally displaced persons rose to a peak of 
70,000 in Dili and about 85,000 in other parts of the country (International Red Cross and Red Crescent, 2007). 
8
 See http://www.wfp.org/countries/timor-leste.  
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fertilisers, pesticides, manure or improved seeds, so that their crops are much 
more vulnerable to locusts, plagues and bad weather conditions.9 
Rural households have withstood destruction, violence, upheavals and 
shocks by virtue of basic survival strategies such as hiding in the mountains in 
times of strife or trading cigarettes, petrol or kerosene in the informal economy in 
more peaceful times. Street begging is also on the rise. While these strategies may 
ensure bare-bones existence, they are no basis for community production or 
sustainable development. Some donors offer targeted microcredit programmes 
but these can only have partial, discontinuous and insufficient effects because 
poverty and poverty-related problems are national in scope, socioeconomically 
structural by nature, and likely to be resolved only if the antipoverty programme 
is long lasting and comprehensive, as BI is. 
In January 2006, the Treaty on Certain Maritime Arrangements in the Timor 
Sea, signed by Australia and East Timor, provisionally resolved a bitter maritime 
boundary dispute between the two nations (Scheiner, 2006). One of the smaller 
deposits, the Bayu-Undan field, began production in February 2005, and the 
government’s budget rose from US$80 million to almost double that in 2006. It is 
estimated that this field will generate about US$250 million per annum over a 
projected 20-year life span, around US$5 billion in total. Another area, the 
Greater Sunrise field, is expected to bring in US$10 billion in the 30 years of the 
project’s projected life. Seeking to avoid the pitfalls of a sudden sharp rise in 
revenues (as in Chad and Nigeria), the Alkatiri government established a 
Petroleum Fund to manage the flow of revenue and curb corruption. The Fund 
legislation requires that all oil and gas revenue be deposited into a single 
account. The government can spend only a small fraction of this revenue, 
depending on gains made by the fund’s investments (mainly in low-risk bonds) 
so that when the oil and gas reserves are exhausted, future generations will still 
have substantial wealth.10 The law establishes monitoring organisations to 
supervise fund management, and periodical reports are issued for public 
scrutiny. 
An East Timor BI partially financed by oil and gas revenues would bring 
about an immediate distribution of a regular micro-income (as opposed to micro-
credits) received every month without external interference. Consider, for 
                                                 
9 East Timor lost 30% of its crops in 2007, the immediate causes being drought, plagues and locusts (the 
historical causes of chronic underproduction still need to be addressed, and would be with a BI). It was 
estimated that one fifth of the population (220,000) people would go hungry or starve without major food aid 
(United Nations, 2007). 
10 For an example of funding a BI through a Petroleum Fund, see the discussion on the Alaska Permanent Fund 
in Section 3. 
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instance, a BI of US$30, which would bring recipients considerably above the 
poverty line in East Timor. For a total population of 1.2 million, the overall 
annual sum of a universal BI of US$30 per person per month would be US$432 
million. Another proposal could be a BI of US$30 for people over 15 years of age 
(US$216 million) and US$15 for children under 15 (US$108 million), some 50% of 
the population (UNDP, 2006, p. 8.), a total of US$324 million. A poverty-line BI 
paying just over 60 US cents per day for the entire population (US$20 per 
month), would cost US$288 million. With a BI of US$20, a poor family with 6 
dependents would receive a guaranteed monthly income of US$160 or US$1,920 
per year. In a hamlet of, let's say 20 similar families, this BI would bring in 
US$3,200 per month or US$38,400 per year, a figure which gives an idea of what 
this income flow might mean for small communities like those in East Timor. 
What this could mean in terms of food production is illustrated by a project 
of cultivating rice with buffaloes in the economically devastated rural area of 
Uatulari, whose population is about 20,000. The Catalan government financed 
the project through a Timorese NGO for a total of US$142,680 from 2000 to 2003 
(US$47,560 per year), or roughly US$2.38 per person per year. The area achieved 
self-sufficiency in rice cultivation before the end of the period and was able to 
supply seeds to nearby areas. Restoring the Uatulari buffaloes is the local 
equivalent of providing “machinery” for preparing the abandoned rice fields by 
treading the soil to compact it prior to planting, but this “machinery” also 
produces manure, milk, meat and hides, has ceremonial significance and 
reinforces community values because the buffalo is traditionally community 
property. However, with a change of government in Catalonia, funding stopped 
and the project never went beyond the successful pilot project stage. A BI of 
US$20 per person per month would bring a guaranteed US$4.8 million into 
Uatulari every year – about one hundred times what the Catalan Government 
gave. Clearly, the impact of such a stable source of income would be highly 
remarkable in terms of successful local development. 
According to Tim Anderson (2006), developing countries have to choose 
between food security and an agricultural development strategy focused on 
consolidating local production with the generalised development of local market 
networks, and a policy that is export oriented, which generally means 
monocropping, concentration of landholding and systemic inequality, not to 
mention negative environmental effects. Small holdings not only contribute 
market produce on the local level but also they reinforce food and social security 
and offer a wider spread of productive livelihoods as well as tending to result in 
better environmental management. Yet, local production is endangered. As 
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Marcel Mazoyer has observed, “free trade with its downward trend in real 
agricultural prices and its price fluctuations will condemn further hundreds of 
millions of small farmers and agricultural workers to stagnation, 
impoverishment, migration and hence to unemployment and low wages, 
especially in developing countries but also to some extent in developed 
countries” (Mazoyer, 2001, p. 22). 
A related problem is that massive migration to the capital Dili in 1999 
because of the militia violence has created an enduring problem of urban-rural 
population imbalance. In particular, the great destructive capacity of 
traumatised, unemployed and disaffected youth shows that they do not feel 
included as citizens of the new nation and its constitutional project of 
constructing a peaceful and economically viable society. Again, 280,000 people 
were displaced from the country during the postoccupation militia violence, 
including militia members themselves. Clearly, these people cannot be integrated 
back into a community that does not exist because it has no productive base. 
Including the returnees in a BI scheme would go a long way towards 
reintegrating them and establishing peaceful coexistence, apart from providing 
them with real membership in society through giving them the material means of 
existence. 
Another marginalised group comprises former FALINTIL11 guerrilla fighters 
– men (and some women) who renounced their youth and any educational and 
employment possibilities they may have had in order to fight for their country’s 
independence. These people, their widows and dependents, account for some 
40,000 people. They are the country’s heroes, yet are economically and socially 
excluded, and some have now turned to gang violence. In short, a socially 
inclusive economy based on a universal BI would favour many essential 
processes of reconciliation, in great part because it would grant everybody the set 
of material assets that would enable them to redefine their plans and projects, 
from both autonomous and lifelong perspectives. 
A further exacerbating factor is the demographic reality in which the poorest 
families tend to have the largest number of children. The current fertility rate in 
East Timor is 7.8 children per woman, the highest in the world.12 Irrespective of 
the absence of family planning facilities and basic health education, having more 
children is regarded as a mechanism for replacing children who die in their 
                                                 
11 FALINTIL stands for Forças Armadas da Libertação Nacional de Timor-Leste (Armed Forces for the National 
Liberation of East Timor). 
12 See World Bank East Timor Country Brief, September 2006.  
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/EASTASIAPACIFICEXT/TIMORLESTEEXTN/0,,
contentMDK:20174826~pagePK:1497618~piPK:217854~theSitePK:294022,00.html. 
8 Basic Income Studies Vol. 5 [2010], No. 1, Article 6
http://www.bepress.com/bis/vol5/iss1/art6
DOI: 10.2202/1932-0183.1141
infancy and thus in effect acts as a form of social insurance or pension plan for 
parents. That the mother’s health is usually greatly undermined by many 
pregnancies and giving birth in inadequate conditions is a lesser consideration in 
desperate circumstances. A guaranteed form of social insurance such as a BI 
would lower the birth rate in the long run, thereby correcting a dramatic skewing 
towards the young, dependent members of society while also improving the 
health of mothers and children in particular. Moreover, it would be a highly 
effective mechanism for abolishing child labour and getting children into 
classrooms, which inter alia would also have long-term effects on health. 
All the problems raised above lead us to believe that a BI in East Timor (and 
developing countries in general) would constitute sound policy compared to any 
targeted cash-transfer scheme. Targeted cash schemes do not permit articulation 
of a productive network, of a domestic market or of an independent, well-
integrated society. In effect, users of such programmes depend on the will of 
those in charge of the programmes and, therefore, they are not given the real 
opportunity of making decisions about their projects in keeping with their actual 
wishes and needs and the particular circumstances of each local economy. In our 
view, economic development is much more easily achieved by breaking ties of 
dependency and promoting the emergence of robust productive projects at both 
the individual and group levels – projects that are autonomously conceived and 
planned from within as opposed to being imposed from outside.13 If 
development is to be from within, the obvious question then is how to finance it. 
3. Three Options for Financing a BI in East Timor 
In the context of East Timor, we believe there are three main options for 
financing a BI: changing budgetary priorities, adjusting the income tax structure, 
or increasing VAT and excise duties on luxury goods such as cars, alcohol or 
tobacco. These options are not mutually exclusive, and in East Timor a 
combination of the first and third might be the most feasible choice at present. 
Changing budgetary priorities would necessarily involve oil and gas 
revenues since they account for such a large part of the budget. In the 2006–2007 
budget, petroleum revenues represented 92% of the total, an expenditure of 
approximately US$400 million. However, the expected revenue from petroleum 
                                                 
13 There remains the need for universal health care and free high-quality education, which are as important as a 
constant income flow in guaranteeing inalienable social standing that affords to individuals and communities 
the socioeconomic security that ensures their local and national development. 
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activities is around 215% of planned expenditures, generating a large surplus.14 
The East Timor Petroleum Fund Quarterly stated recently that on 31 December 
2006, the Fund had a net asset of approximately US$1.3 billion. Both fiscal and 
current account balances in 2006 recorded surpluses of more than 100% of non-
oil GDP and these are expected to rise in 2007–2008, reflecting large and growing 
revenue from offshore oil and gas fields.15 One pertinent example of funding a BI 
through a petroleum fund is the Alaska Permanent Fund, created in 1976 (Alaska 
Permanent Fund Corporation, 1988), which, according to some authors 
(Vanderborght and Van Parijs, 2005, p. 25), has made Alaska the most egalitarian 
of all the states in the USA.16 
The other two options for funding a BI – adjusting the income tax structure 
and increasing VAT and excise taxes – ensure that higher earners and spenders 
bear the cost of benefiting the poor. The latter option in particular makes sense in 
a dual economy like East Timor’s with its high-spending expatriate sector, which 
has recently increased with the buildup of the UN mission. This should be 
considered in the context of the fact that, between 2002 and the end of 2006, East 
Timor received US$3.5 billion in aid from the UN and international agencies but 
the bulk of the money went into the wages of aid officials, consultancy fees and 
contracts with companies based in the donor countries and, in accordance with 
World Bank criteria, is essentially used for providing infrastructure and services 
for businesses and foreign investors. Partially financing a BI with higher VAT – 
except for necessary goods – and excise taxes could stem the flow of resources 
into foreign hands while countering World Bank, Asian Development Bank and 
IMF policies that threaten to undermine East Timor’s economic independence. 
Critics of the tax reform option might doubt that it would have sufficient 
impact on the poorest strata in East Timor to count as a genuine option. 
However, a recent study conducted in Catalonia has demonstrated that a BI 
funded through a personal income tax is a technically viable option that provides 
all citizens with a generous BI, but most importantly, it favours the poorest strata 
(Arcarons et al., 2005; Arcarons and Raventós, 2010; Raventós, 2007). More 
pertinent in terms of poor-country practicalities is the tax-funded BI proposal in 
Namibia made by Claudia and Dirk Haarmann (2005). Although the Namibia 
                                                 
14 See an Australian Government assessment at   
http://www.aph.gov.au/House/committee/jsct/6_7_february2007/subs/sub9.pdf. 
15 See World Bank, East Asia Update, April 2007.  
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPHALFYEARLYUPDATE/Resources/550192-1175629375615/TL-EAP-
Update-April2007.pdf. 
16 For further discussion of BI in Alaska, see the Alaska Permanent Fund Corporation web site: 
http://www.apfc.org. 
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proposal does not meet the requirement of our definition – that the BI must be 
above the poverty line so as to adequately satisfy the conditions of material 
existence of all citizens – it is still expected to reduce absolute poverty levels; 
reduce inequality and, in particular, help those most in need without establishing 
a complicated administrative structure; be sustainable and affordable without 
retarding economic growth; and avoid the negative consequences of alternative 
poverty-reduction strategies. In general terms, models of tax-based financing 
involve integrating the BI financing strategy into the taxation system, either by 
reforming existing taxes and displacing the burden of some taxes onto others, or 
by creating new taxes. In brief, it means taking more money from the richest 
members of the society in taxes than what they receive as a BI. Some of the 
middle-income citizens may pay a little more in taxes but would still benefit 
overall, while the poorest benefit outright. Nobody would be living below the 
poverty line. 
Just what proportion of East Timor tax revenue could go towards paying a 
universal BI of US$30 (at a total cost of US$432 million) would become clearer 
with a tax-effort analysis evaluating the country’s taxable capacity based on the 
structural characteristics of the economy and its capacity to raise taxes. Whatever 
the case, three administrative conditions need to be met in order to implement a 
BI for all citizens. First, the efficiency of the existing tax system must be 
maintained or (most likely) improved. Second, an identification system for every 
citizen or accredited resident must be installed. Third, a smooth, cost-effective BI 
delivery system is needed.17 This may be complex but is much less so than is 
dealing with the chronic social and economic drains of poverty and persistent 
food insecurity. And it is certainly less complex than trying to solve intractable 
structural problems by means of conditional programmes that have very costly 
administration, that are stigmatising and paralysing for beneficiaries and that, in 
not being preventative, only lead to further problems in their attempts to cure. 
4. Hard Choices: What Model for East Timor? 
One alternative diametrically opposite to a BI is the plan of President José 
Ramos-Horta to establish a tax-free regime along the lines of Hong Kong to ease 
the way for foreign investors.18 Ramos-Horta, undeterred by the evident 
                                                 
17 For a detailed analysis of the technical and normative challenges to, and of the difficulties of administering a 
BI system, see De Wispelaere and Stirton (2009). 
18 See Geoff Thompson, “Ramos Horta Pushes for Tax-Free E. Timor,” ABC News, 30 June 2007. 
http://abc.net.au/news/stories/2007/06/30/1966522.htm. 
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differences between Hong Kong and East Timor, proposes using the common-
heritage oil and gas revenues to create attractive conditions for foreign investors, 
thereby establishing a capitalist economy that is more suited to a trading-
financier-technocratic-former-city-state-now-Special-Administrative-Region than 
to an independent democratic republic. 
The choices for East Timor are stark – between the crude, socially polarising 
capitalist model on the one hand and, on the other hand, a model that respects 
the democratic principles enshrined in its Constitution – principles with origins 
in the classical republican notions of freedom and citizenship and that have 
arisen from universal human yearnings and aspirations for freedom, self-
realisation and peaceful coexistence in civic life. As is all too clear, when the 
control of economic activity is confined to the decisions of a few, freedom-
throttling market relations are given the highest priority in the organisation of 
social life. The worst that could happen to East Timor is that its leaders should 
opt for the expropriating neoliberal model that its president is upholding, even 
while the Constitution continues to hold out the bright promise of a very 
different future. It is to be hoped that some leaders in East Timor will strive to 
fulfil the promises of their Constitution and of some “universal” declarations (for 
example, the Vienna Declaration of the 1993 World Conference on Human 
Rights), urging that “poverty is a brutal denial of human rights and…a guarantee 
of human dignity requires eradication of human poverty and social exclusion” 
(UN Country Team, 2000, p. 33). 
Apart from upholding the need to embrace an idea of freedom based on 
people’s material existence, especially in poor countries, we have endeavoured to 
offer a glimpse of what new possibilities and solutions to structural problems 
might be offered by a BI in East Timor. BI is not a panacea that would solve all 
the social and economic problems of East Timor, but it would mean much more 
widely spread opportunities for people to participate in productive activities, 
enhanced social inclusion within reinforced local communities, greater political 
participation, and a major reduction of poverty and poverty-related problems.19 
The material independence a BI would confer upon all East Timor’s citizens 
would increase their options for leading free and autonomous lives as 
                                                 
19 These considerations, although made with East Timor in mind, are generally valid for countries that face similar 
political and economic constraints. Several Latin American and African countries present problems of 
underdevelopment and dependence vis-à-vis more powerful countries and companies. As in East Timor, these 
countries have energy resources that, properly managed, could make it possible to introduce measures like BI that 
would favour the articulation of undominated economies that are in keeping with these countries’ national 
conditions and social needs. For an exhaustive analysis of BI’s potential for developing countries, with particular 
attention to Argentina, Brazil, Namibia and South Africa, see the debate section of Basic Income Studies 2 (1). 
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individuals and as community members. BI would thus confer upon East Timor 
an important instrument to realize republican freedom. 
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